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HISTORIAN GADDIS SMITH REGARDS 
the Organization of American States as the ulti-
mate expression of the Monroe Doctrine and the 
U.S. assertion of hegemony in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Others, like Carolyn M. Shaw, suggest that 
the U.S.–Latin American relationship within the OAS featured varying 
degrees of cooperation, resistance, and assertion by all members. In a 
sense, both scholars are correct and incorrect. On one hand, the OAS 
provided a salve for U.S. existential Cold War concerns; the organization 
could be a powerful juridical tool to ensure regional security and resist 
the Communist menace. On the other hand, Latin Americans found in 
the OAS long-sought enshrinement of democracy and nonintervention 
as foundations of the inter-American system. As the OAS evolved from 
a theoretical to practical tool, however, a curious dynamic emerged. 
The smooth conduct of U.S. policy was impossible without the pres-
ence of the OAS, but Latin Americans often proved more influential 
in the forging of hemispheric policy. Indeed, in most cases it was only 
when certain Latin American leaders felt threatened—typically by the 
policies of other Latin American nations, rather than by the United 
States—that the more powerful pieces of OAS legislation emerged. 
When the U.S. Eisenhower administration sought to contain Fidel 
Castro, Latin Americans kept the focus on Dominican dictator Rafael 
Trujillo. The 1962 Punta del Este Declaration that framed Communism 
as an un-American ideology came about only after much horse-trading 
and arm-twisting by the United States. The August 1964 censorship of 
Cuba—ostensibly serving U.S. interests—resulted primarily from the 
efforts of Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela. Decades after the Cold War, 
we continue to wrestle with the riddle of the OAS: the ideological and 
diplomatic contours of the Cold War made the oganization vital to the 
United States, yet the body often thwarted U.S. policymaking and made 
Latin Americans the prime movers—and perhaps hegemonic actors—in 
the inter-American relationship of the 1950s and 1960s.
 Although the United States had presented itself as a champion of 
American security since President James Monroe’s famous (or infa-
mous) declaration of 1823, it was not until the beginning of the Cold 
War that U.S. policymakers felt compelled to create a formal, collec-
tive security system. Old fears, that European empires would nibble at 
the edges of the hemisphere in an ideologically neutral positive-sum 
game, gave way to new fears that an ideologically driven Soviet empire 
would absorb undeveloped regions as well as the United States itself in 
a zero-sum game. The United States and the West would resist, wear-
ing down and discrediting the communist system through a policy of 
containment and indirect confrontation. Such a struggle could only 
be won, however, if Washington cast itself as a reliable champion of 
democratic values, and cultivated a roster of allies that would bear 
the ideological and real burdens of the long struggle. With the Act of 
Chapultepec, Rio Treaty, and Act of Bogotá, the United States and the 
twenty republics of Latin America created the Organization of American 
States and enshrined principles of democracy, equality, cooperation, 
and, perhaps most important, united resistance to direct or indirect 
aggression toward any party nation. Gone were earlier notions, like 
those of the Roosevelt Corollary, that the United States would be the 
sole arbiter of security and responsible governance. But because of the 
inordinate power of the United States, and the fact that only the United 
States had vested interests throughout the hemisphere, it was at least 
implicit that the sensibilities of an earlier era were still in play. 
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 Yet the dynamics of the Cold War tended 
to level the playing field between the super-
powers and the developing and decolonizing 
world. As thinkers like Walt W. Rostow noted, 
the advent of nuclear weapons and ideological 
blocs meant that there could be no dictation 
of terms, either by the superpowers against 
one another or by the superpowers against less 
powerful nations. Instead, the allegiance of a 
given smaller country was a highly valuable 
commodity, since dictation would only create 
a propaganda opportunity for the other side. 
In the American context, Washington had to 
balance competing needs. It could not afford 
to allow leftist influence to pare off regional 
governments, but neither could it appear 
heavy-handed in establishing an anti-commu-
nist quarantine. The OAS was the ideal forum 
in which to maintain such a united front, but 
there were twenty nations with which to con-
tend, and only the most skillful propaganda 
and diplomacy could suggest that the interests 
of the United States and Latin America tended 
to be identical.
 This situation persisted in the first decade 
of the OAS’s existence, such that the United 
States found it easier to work outside the 
framework of the organization. The 1954 
CIA intervention in Guatemala provided the 
clearest example of this trend. In the run-
up to the Ninth International Conference of 
American States, scheduled for March, U.S. 
and Latin American foreign ministers strongly 
disagreed over priorities. The Latin Americans 
made it clear that they remained far more 
interested in addressing economic under-
development than U.S. concerns about the 
Red Menace in places like Guatemala, where 
Washington was concerned that democrati-
cally elected President José Arevalo had veered 
dangerously leftward. Argentina and Mexico 
voiced particularly strong opposition, sug-
gesting that Washington might use the OAS 
as a cover for unilateral intervention in this 
case or in the future. U.S. Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles succeeded in shepherding 
through a declaration of American solidarity 
against Communism, but only after promising 
increased U.S. aid, and only after fifty ballots 
had been taken. As the Eisenhower adminis-
tration focused on plans for an invasion of 
Guatemala by exile Carlos Castillo Armas, 
Washington prepared a case for presentation 
to the OAS only as a last resort. Eisenhower 
and his aides reasoned that, in light of the 
hard sell needed to gain the vaguely worded 
Caracas Resolution, obtaining Latin American 
support for decisive action against Guatemala 
would be nearly impossible.
 The U.S. general avoidance of the OAS as a 
policymaking tool continued until Fidel Castro 
took power in Cuba and began a program of 
land reform and other potentially leftist poli-
cies. Yet in this case the bulk of attention of 
the OAS members centered on Rafael Trujillo, 
a close U.S. ally who increasingly pushed the 
already-broad precedents of authoritarian rule 
in the Americas. During 1956 and 1957, the 
FBI and State Department had investigated the 
disappearances of Trujillo critic Jesús Galindez, 
and Robert Murphy, a U.S. citizen working for 
Dominican Airlines. The United States deter-
mined that the Trujillo regime had been directly 
involved in the deaths of the two men. Yet Tru-
jillo’s willingness to work in lockstep with U.S. 
diplomatic and military policy encouraged the 
Eisenhower administration to pass only mild 
sanctions. By the summer of 1959, however, the 
democratic but nonetheless nationalist Romulo 
Betancourt had replaced dictator Marcos Pérez 
Jiménez in Venezuela and had joined Castro 
in a heated rhetorical—and sometimes mil-
itary—duel with Trujillo. A curious dynamic 
thus emerged:  Eisenhower tried to muzzle 
Trujillo while currying Betancourt’s support 
against Castro; Trujillo and Castro stridently 
defied each of the other three; and Betancourt 
intimated that he would support anti-Castro 
measures only after Eisenhower assisted Ven-
ezuelan efforts against Trujillo in the OAS.
 For the next year, the OAS served primar-
ily as a forum for Latin American criticism 
of Trujillo—and by extension U.S. policy in 
the hemisphere—rather than a forum for the 
U.S. fight against Castro and communism. 
The August 1959 meetings in Santiago, Chile, 
served as an indirect attack against Trujillo’s 
human rights violations and established a 
precedent for future OAS human rights com-
missions. The following year, Trujillo stepped 
up his campaign against Betancourt, send-
ing aircraft to drop anti-government leaflets 
over Caracas—though the Dominican planes 
accidentally flew over the Dutch island of 
Curacao—and ordering an assassination 
attempt against him. Betancourt survived a 
June 1960 car bombing and spearheaded an 
immediate convening of the OAS in San José, 
Costa Rica. The August meetings determined 
that the Trujillo government had indeed been 
involved in these interventions, and called on 
the American states to break diplomatic rela-
tions with the Dominican Republic. During the 
summer of 1960, meanwhile, Cuba had begun 
expropriations of U.S.-owned sugar plantations 
and threatened U.S. oil interests, compelling 
the Eisenhower administration to attempt to 
secure OAS support for collective intervention 
in future cases where an American republic 
might threaten the interests of another. Again, 
Latin Americans resisted these veiled attacks 
against Cuba. From their perspective, there 
was a wide gulf between the direct interven-
tion that Trujillo had pursued, and the more 
ambiguous policy Castro executed in Cuba. 
When Eisenhower broke ties with Cuba, in 
January 1961, only Venezuela and Colombia 
followed suit. Even this development owed 
principally to the fact that Castro had increas-
ingly turned his ire against these nations rather 
than from acquiescence to U.S. desires. 
 During the spring and summer of 1961, Cas-
tro’s neighbors in the Caribbean basin became 
increasingly nervous about his political bent 
and sought to use the OAS as a means to pro-
tect their national security. In May Castro had 
affirmed himself as a Communist and as an 
ally of the Soviet Union, and Soviet Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev pledged armed support to 
the island in the case of armed aggression. 
Cuba also began broadcasting propaganda 
throughout the region, calling for the leftist 
overthrow of sitting governments. By year’s 
end, Peru and Colombia succeeded in calling 
for a meeting of foreign ministers at Punta del 
Este, Uruguay, in January 1962 to consider the 
problem of Cuban aggression and alignment 
with the Soviet Union. The United States was 
of course highly in favor of such a meeting. Yet 
Washington failed to achieve its goals of getting 
the rest of Latin America to break relations with 
Cuba and to enforce harsh economic sanctions. 
Mexico and the Southern Cone were openly 
opposed, and it took promises of increased U.S. 
economic aid to get nations like Uruguay and 
Haiti on board. Ultimately, the United States 
acceded to a compromise in which Cuba would 
be determined to be violating the OAS charter 
and Caracas Resolution by being under the 
control of the alien ideology of Communism, 
and the extra-hemispheric control of the Soviet 
Union, and therefore suspended from partici-
pation in the OAS. Despite this compromise, 
consensus remained elusive. Ultimately, the 
vote to suspend Cuba barely achieved the 
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necessary two-thirds margin to pass, being 14–1 
with six abstentions. Again, Washington tended 
to find itself thwarted by the assertive nations 
of Latin America in the Cold War context.
 The unprecedented OAS sanctions that 
ostracized Cuba—so long a goal of the United 
States—occurred primarily as a result of Ven-
ezuelan President Romulo Betancourt’s feud 
with Castro. During 1962 Cuba had begun a 
major effort to train leftists throughout the 
hemisphere and return them to their home 
countries as revolutionaries. In 1963 Venezu-
ela became the epicenter of these subversive 
efforts, as guerrillas and urban terrorists asso-
ciated with the Venezuelan Communist Party 
and Leftist Revolutionary Movement sought 
to disrupt presidential elections scheduled for 
December, perhaps setting the stage for a series 
of coups that would usher them into power. 
While anecdotal evidence existed that these 
sorts of activities occurred, neither the United 
States nor Venezuela could offer concrete proof 
of Cuban intervention in domestic affairs. In 
November, however, the Venezuelan National 
Guard discovered a three-ton arms cache on 
the Paraguana Peninsula near the border with 
Colombia. Subsequent tests proved that the 
weapons were of Cuban origin, and Betan-
court and his successor, Raul Leoni, sought 
to bring Castro to account within the context 
of the OAS. Working closely with the United 
States, Venezuela sought the concurrence of 
the rest of the hemisphere in breaking rela-
tions with Cuba, and in the establishment of 
an embargo of all trade in nonhumanitarian 
goods. As before, however, there proved to be 
limits beyond which even close U.S. allies like 
Venezuela would not go. Assistant Secretary 
of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas 
C. Mann spearheaded U.S. efforts to use the 
Paraguana arms discovery as a justification 
for collective military force against Castro. 
Throughout the spring of 1964, Mann and the 
State Department crafted what they termed a 
“blank check” to be attached to any eventual 
resolution coming out of the OAS meetings. If 
Cuba could be found guilty of both direct and 
indirect intervention in the affairs of Venezu-
ela—thus violating the Rio Treaty as well as 
the OAS and UN charters—the United States 
might also secure an authorization for uni-
lateral armed force in case of a similar future 
incident without having to return to the OAS 
for an explicit authorization. Perhaps because 
several other Latin American nations perceived 
the implications of such a blanket authori-
zation of force, Mann’s “blank check” was a 
nonstarter. Ultimately, the Venezuelan drive for 
severed relations and an embargo carried the 
day by a 15–4 vote. By November, however, 
the United States could feel gratified, as every 
Latin American nation with the exception of 
Mexico had broken off diplomatic relations 
with Cuba.
 While obviously the United States succeeded 
in carrying out the major contours of its anti-
Castro policy within the OAS framework, 
Washington was often forced to wait until Latin 
Americans provided the critical mass for puni-
tive action. At least in the pivotal years of the 
OAS—the 1950s and 1960s—Latin American 
democratic forces and Latin American strong-
men were the prime movers in determining the 
boundaries of debate. Trujillo had succeeded 
in perfecting the institution of the caudillo 
during three decades of rule, and might have 
extended his dictatorship another decade had 
he not engaged in a reckless campaign against 
his neighbors. Despite the fact that such 
dictatorships violated the OAS Charter guar-
antee of democratic governance—a fact that 
Betancourt was fond of stressing—the United 
States was willing to overlook the problem. 
When Trujillo sought to export his despotism, 
Washington had little choice other than to 
cashier its ally and support Latin American 
initiatives. Washington, further, was forced to 
wait three years for the rest of Latin America 
to accede to its desire to fully isolate Cuba 
politically. And again, this outcome centered 
on Castro’s decision to export his revolution 
in the form of arms deliveries to Venezuelan 
leftists. Absent the missteps of these antidemo-
cratic leaders, U.S. use of the OAS would have 
been even more complicated than it was. The 
OAS provides a unique window into the com-
plexity of U.S. policymaking, and U.S.–Latin 
American relations, in the Cold War context. 
The centrality of ideology to the geopolitical 
showdown between the United States and 
the Soviet Union tended to make rhetoric as 
important as reality. The United States needed 
to be able to point to evidence that it was 
on the side of justice and democracy, both 
in terms of its policies and dealings with the 
wider world. Bodies like the UN, NATO, and 
the OAS served these functions to an extent. 
But the emphasis on collectivism also served 
to restrict the United States. The relationship 
with Latin America starkly illustrated such a 
problem. Having shepherded the creation of 
what ought to have been a powerful tool for 
the exertion of hegemony, Washington often 
had to ignore the OAS altogether, or wait until 
Latin Americans partially endorsed U.S. policy, 
so that the “mousetrap” functioned in the way 
that the United States had intended.
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